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Public health ethics is on the map. In the past
year, bioethicists and public health practition-
ers have begun to focus their critical attention
on this complex and understudied topic.
Much remains to be done. Childress et al.
(2002), for example, describe their account of
public health ethics as a rough conceptual map
of a terrain with undeﬁned boundaries. At a
time in which global positioning systems can
guide the family car and satellite photos can be
purchased over the Internet, this metaphorical
equivalent of “surveying unexplored territory”
says volumes about the complexity of the topic
and its promise.
From the many issues that dot the
landscape of public health ethics, we have been
asked to discuss the social responsibilities of
environmental health researchers. Our focus
will be on the responsibilities of epidemiolo-
gists, a choice made for several compelling rea-
sons. Epidemiology sits at the center of the
science and practice of environmental health,
and more generally, at the center of public
health. Although it is often referred to as a basic
science of public health, epidemiology connects
the acquisition of scientiﬁc knowledge with its
application in preventive interventions, pro-
grams, and policies. This connection suggests a
fundamental question: What are our responsi-
bilities as epidemiologists? Do we, for example,
have a joint responsibility to participate in sci-
ence and to apply the knowledge gained? This
is a key concern for us as researchers, health
professionals, and as teachers.
Epidemiology is a required subject, and
public health ethics is an emerging subject in
the curricula of schools of public health
(Coughlin et al. 1999). Another reason we
are keen to examine the social responsibilities
of epidemiologists is that we need to teach
students and mentor postdoctoral fellows and
junior faculty about what their professional
colleagues expect of them, what society
expects of them, and from where their
responsibilities arise. 
Any discussion of social responsibility will
require a clear understanding of social roles, a
topic of considerable controversy within epi-
demiology (Savitz et al. 1999; Weed and Mink
2002). One of the characteristics of this debate
is its lack of ethical depth; arguments to date
reach no deeper than published professional
ethics guidelines. Our inquiry will dig down to
the foundations of public health ethics, provid-
ing a perspective on what lends moral content
to the responsibilities of our profession. 
Finally, our inquiry is intended to assist all
public health researchers who seek to define
their social responsibilities. For those who are
involved primarily in environmental health
research, we can think of at least two con-
nected and current topics—environmental
justice and community-based participatory
research (CBPR)—that are ideally suited for
analysis and reflection in terms of social
responsibility. 
For all these reasons, we seek answers to
the following questions: What are the social
responsibilities of epidemiologists, and by
extension, environmental health researchers?
From where do these responsibilities arise?
How do current approaches to environmental
justice reﬂect these responsibilities?
Public Health Ethics and the
Nature of Responsibility
Public health ethics is no simple matter,
reflecting the many dimensions and diverse
interconnections found in public health itself,
among health professionals, everyday people
and the communities they represent, and even-
tually those who will call themselves public
health ethicists. Public health is about disease
prevention and health promotion, lifestyle
practices, cultures, the environment, social
forces, historical traditions, and science in all
its theoretical, methodological, and technologi-
cal splendor. Public health is about preventive
medicine, the media, government programs
and policies, economics, and the law. 
The ethics of public health infuses these
dimensions and interconnections. Some see
public health ethics as an analytical tool for
program evaluation (Kass 2001). Others
describe it in terms of broad ethical theories:
communitarianism, liberalism, and utilitari-
anism (Roberts and Reich 2002). Some see
public health ethics as clusters of moral con-
cepts and norms, variously called values, prin-
ciples, and rules with room for theories,
methods, and cases (Childress et al. 2002;
McKeown and Weed 2002; Weed and
McKeown 2001). Public health ethics can
also be classified into various components:
professional ethics, applied ethics, advocacy
ethics, critical ethics, and codes of ethics
(Callahan and Jennings 2002). 
The social responsibility of public health
professionals is but one of many concerns in
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is nevertheless a central concern. As Ogletree
(1996) reminds us, responsibility is a concept
particularly well suited to frame many key
aspects of the ethics of professions faced with
making decisions and taking actions in com-
plex situations. These decisions often involve
advanced technologies, high levels of special-
ization, and overlapping areas of expertise
and concern among decision makers from
diverse educational, political, and social back-
grounds, precisely the situation in contempo-
rary epidemiology and public health. In sum,
responsibility organizes many (although not
all) of public health’s ethical issues in terms
appropriate for professional practitioners.
• At one level, responsibility refers to
accountability. As public health professionals,
we are accountable for—responsible for—
actions taken. We are accountable to society,
to communities, to research participants, and
to our students for actions taken on their
behalf. The precise nature of those actions—
what society expects of us as epidemiologists
and what we expect of ourselves—has yet to
be delineated. For now, it is important to
emphasize that professional responsibility
maps to professional accountability. 
• Responsibility has a deeper meaning as well,
corresponding to commitment. To be
responsible means to be committed to
someone or to some thing. Being responsi-
ble in this deeper sense involves a commit-
ment to positive action, to the pursuit and
achievement of something of value, such as
a social good (Jonas 1984). We will return
to the notion of social goods in public
health. For now, we want to emphasize that
responsibility focuses attention on profes-
sional commitments. Responsible profes-
sionals are committed to recognizing and
carrying out their ethical duties; epidemiol-
ogists and other health researchers would
say that they are committed to the highest
standards of ethics and science, standards
often described in professional ethics guide-
lines (American College of Epidemiology
2000; Soskolne and Light 1996), codes of
ethics (Thomas et al. 2002), or standards of
practice. But there is much more to respon-
sibility than following guidelines. Ethics
guidelines, for example, are built upon a
broader, more general set of ethical princi-
ples and obligations that all health profes-
sionals recognize: respect for persons,
beneﬁcence, nonmaleﬁcence, and justice, to
name the most obvious. Principles, in turn,
are not the only approach to ethical reason-
ing and justification in public health
(Callahan and Jennings 2002; Kass 2001;
Roberts and Reich 2002). Responsibility,
therefore, implies an understanding of these
foundations and an appreciation of their 
relevance to everyday professional practice. 
• Responsibility also involves a commitment
to the fundamental ends of a profession
itself: public health professionals are com-
mitted to the prevention of disease and the
promotion of health, prominent social
goods. Epidemiologists are committed to the
scientiﬁc study of the determinants and dis-
tribution of disease in human populations
and they are committed to the application of
scientiﬁc knowledge to improve the public’s
health through disease prevention and health
promotion. The extent to which epidemiol-
ogists translate these commitments into
action, creating for themselves a role as con-
tributing participants in public health inter-
ventions is a matter of some controversy, to
be examined in detail below. 
• Responsibility is also closely linked to
reliability. Responsible professionals reliably
perform the tasks they set for themselves as
well as the tasks society expects them to
undertake. Indeed, responsibilities are some-
times too narrowly referred to as tasks.
Ideally, responsible professionals perform
their tasks within a professional community
where virtues, for example, integrity, honesty,
prudence, and self-effacement, are fostered
and revealed in the everyday lives of practi-
tioners and mentors. A responsible public
health professional is one who strives to do
professional tasks well; excellence, in our view,
is the ultimate goal of reliable professional
performance (Weed and McKeown 1998).
But which tasks are appropriate for epidemi-
ology? This question bears striking similarity
to the one asked earlier: what actions are we,
as epidemiologists, responsible for? Are all epi-
demiologists committed to public health
action in the same way they are committed to
the practice of public health science? There is
clearly a debate within epidemiology regard-
ing how best to answer these questions, inas-
much as they reﬂect our debate about social
roles and hence about social responsibilities.
To that debate we now turn.
Roles and Responsibilities 
of Epidemiologists: 
Digging Deeper 
The social responsibilities of epidemiologists
cannot be easily disassociated from the profes-
sion’s social roles. The dimensions of responsi-
bility—the commitments, the actions taken for
which we are accountable, and the tasks we
reliably undertake in our commitment to social
goods—are intertwined with our social roles.
What, then, does society expect of us as epi-
demiologists? This is not an easily answered
question. The standing joke is that the public
believes that epidemiologists treat skin diseases.
The science media, on the other hand, have
unfairly portrayed epidemiology as something
of a second-class scientific citizen (Taubes
1995). In this setting, it may be best to
examine the question of social roles from
within epidemiology itself. Society, in other
words, can assign to epidemiology the roles we
epidemiologists show it. 
One of the places to look for an expression
of the role of epidemiology in contemporary
society is in its textbooks written for students
learning about their discipline and what it
expects of them. Consider, for example, a text
on social epidemiology edited by Berkman and
Kawachi (2000), two leading Harvard acade-
mics. We might expect such a text to reveal
something about the social context of the pro-
fession, including the social role of epidemiolo-
gists. The book begins with a narrow deﬁnition
of social epidemiology as the study of the dis-
tribution and social determinants of states of
health in populations. In support of this deﬁni-
tion, a 30-year-old classic text is provided as a
reference (Susser 1973). This earlier text was
written by one of the leading philosophically
oriented practitioners of the discipline, Mervyn
Susser, who begins his account of epidemiol-
ogy using the same definition as that of
Berkman and Kawachi but adds the following
comment: “Some prefer to add that these
activities are for the purpose of the prevention,
surveillance, and control of health disorders in
populations.” Importantly, the authors of the
new textbook on social epidemiology do not
include this reference to public health action in
their deﬁnition. 
Clearly, two textbooks published 30 years
apart do not give a comprehensive account of
the social roles of epidemiologists. But this
comparison does document the presence of a
rift within the profession regarding the extent
to which the social roles of epidemiologists
involve both the practice of science and its
direct application in public health interven-
tions. A better sense of the profound disagree-
ment on the roles and responsibilities of
epidemiology can be found in the report of an
international conference on the future of epi-
demiology sponsored by the International
Epidemiological Association (Anonymous
1999). Many practitioners at that conference
perceived the situation to be the following:
Epidemiology is now recognized as a basic medical
science by many and epidemiologists, like other sci-
entists, have the right to follow their curiosity in
understanding the causes and determinants of dis-
eases. Epidemiological research needs no justiﬁcation
from the outside, and we have no social responsibility
beyond that of all scientists, but we do of course have
social responsibilities as members of a community.
Others disagreed with this assessment
(Anonymous 1999).
Others emphasize that epidemiologists should start
with public health problems and accept the
professional and social responsibilities inherent in try-
ing to solve these problems . . . they accept a social
responsibility to pursue the consequences of (their)
ﬁndings until the public health problem is solved.
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responsibilities of epidemiologists is both fun-
damental and longstanding (Foxman 1989;
Gordis 1991; Rothman and Poole 1985;
Wynder 1985; Yankauer 1984). Previous
attempts to resolve it have relied primarily
upon the published ethics guidelines of epi-
demiologists (Weed 1994; Weed and Mink
2002). There are, of course, other nonethical
approaches, including a historical argument
that the heroes of epidemiology—Snow, Farr,
Guy, Lane-Claypon, Reed, Goldberger, and
Mann, to cite a few examples—are those who
have taken their professional practice beyond
science to its implementation in public health
application, embracing the combined roles and
responsibilities of public health agents and sci-
entists. Another approach to resolving the
debate involves countering arguments that epi-
demiologists are unprepared for the task of
public health advocacy, policymaking, and
other examples of direct applications of scien-
tiﬁc results and judgments by improving edu-
cation and training programs (Weed and Mink
2002). Our intent in this paper is to reexamine
the problem in terms of the ethical framework
that responsibility provides. We will need to
explore the nature of responsibility from a
deeper perspective.
Roots of Responsibility
Reconsidered
We take as a given, an axiom, that the health
of the public is a social good, valued as a wor-
thy goal beyond our preference for it or the
satisfaction we may get in achieving that good.
The same can be said of scientiﬁc knowledge.
Knowledge is valued as a social good in itself. It
is also valued because its attainment is neces-
sary to achieve other ends such as health. These
goods, the health of the public and scientiﬁc
knowledge, imply a set of responsibilities and
therefore duties, tasks, and actions. For exam-
ple, if we assert our intent to conduct research
to increase knowledge as a good, then we
assume certain responsibilities to research par-
ticipants and to the research community, the
violation of which would negate the end we
have committed to pursue. We cannot, for
example, be deceitful or falsify data while also
claiming to pursue knowledge because deceit
and untruthfulness are the antithesis of our
stated goal. 
The pursuit of scientific knowledge
involves a commitment to a kind of quest,
some would say, for the truth, whereas others
would say for fruitful theories and explana-
tions. But it is nevertheless a quest that carries
certain expectations; those who engage in it
typically accept a responsibility to the commu-
nity of scientists and to their speciﬁc discipline,
as well as to some larger goal involving the truth
or explanation or both. Scientiﬁc knowing also
has a social context (Kuhn 1996). That social
context shapes what we know, how we know,
and what we ask; it is also a context in which
we dwell in a mutual relationship with society
and other scientists that is at once nurturing,
supporting, and challenging, holding us to
account. This is one sense in which we have a
social responsibility as epidemiologists, ﬁtting
precisely with a social role as scientist.
By pursuing knowledge we commit to its
value. As a value to which we are committed, it
holds a certain claim on us, so that our pursuit
carries both a sense of responsibility to nurture
it and an obligation to that end. Similarly, if
we hold that health for communities and for
society at large is a social good that has value
beyond the fact of our desiring it, and if it is a
value to which we have committed, then we
assume a responsibility for it. We have, in
other words, an obligation to take positive
action for its actualization.
Our focus upon obligations (and therefore
duties) brings into sharp focus our debt to and
our differences from Immanuel Kant (1996a,
1996b). We begin with the concept of auton-
omy, central to bioethics and often traced to
Kant, although his concept is rather different
from the view of autonomy as complete free-
dom to choose or not to choose some action.
For Kant, autonomy has to do with acting out
of duty to the moral law (Kant 1996a).
Freedom to determine our actions in confor-
mity to the moral law is a condition of our
being subject to moral law (Kant 1996b). The
morals rules we autonomously determine are
constrained by the necessity of conforming to
what Kant termed the “categorical imperative”
(Kant 1996a). In a comment on the late John
Rawls, a modern Kantian, Beauchamp and
Childress write, “Autonomy is moral self-
legislation through a structure of reason and
will that is common to all rational agents.”
(Beauchamp and Childress 1994) 
However, we have not attempted to lay a
theoretical foundation for moral law or a cate-
gorical imperative. Rather, we have posited a
valued end (the health of the public) as one to
which public health researchers freely commit.
Following Jonas (1984), our responsibility has
to do with the claim attendant to that commit-
ment. We do posit the antecedent value of the
end, that is, we do not hold that the social
good of public health is good because we value
it but that we value and commit ourselves to it
because we recognize it as a good worthy of
such commitment, and in that acknowledg-
ment an obligation is implied. Kant argued for
the a priori rational nature of the moral law,
which is the ground of our moral duty, and
insisted the moral law is formal, namely, not
deﬁned by contingent ends. In our argument,
that which claims our duty is not a priori, and
though its value is not contingent on our
valuing it, its practical authority is contingent
on our endorsement of it as a good and our
commitment to achieving it. As noted above,
we take it as axiomatic for public health
researchers that the health of the public is a
social good, valued as a worthy goal beyond
our preference for it or the satisfaction we may
get in achieving that good. 
For those familiar with Kant’s rejection of
a teleological approach or consideration of con-
sequences as the basis for moral judgment, it
may seem clear that our position deviates in
placing central importance on the goal of the
public’s health. On the other hand, our
emphasis on responsibility is not grounded in a
thoroughgoing consequentialism or utilitarian-
ism. Rather, our view bridges elements of the
Kantian tradition of individual responsibility
with elements of communitarianism. In Kant,
the sense of duty comes from within the indi-
vidual in response to the moral law and ﬁnds
expression in the autonomous legislation of
universal laws and being subject to these laws.
Communitarianism is rooted in the Hegelian
criticism of Kant’s individualism and focuses
instead on social roles and responsibilities and
the importance of social virtues and values
(MacIntyre 1984). Our position also empha-
sizes the importance of larger societal values
and structures in framing and fashioning con-
ditions in which people and communities can
be healthy. This is closely related to the com-
munitarian emphasis on shared goals and
obligations and the role of shared history and
culture in shaping them. 
Indeed, considerable philosophical support
for our perspective can be enlisted from
MacIntyre’s writings, especially those focusing
upon the nature of a practice in contemporary
society (1984). Certainly few would disagree
with the idea that epidemiologists practice
their profession. But what is a practice?
MacIntyre defines a practice as a “coherent
and complex form of socially established coop-
erative human activity through which goods
internal to that form of activity are realized.”
The notion of goods internal to a practice is
important. Internal goods are to be contrasted
with the external goods of a practice, such as
financial gain or fame. The primary goods
internal to the practice of epidemiology are
the pursuit of objective scientific knowledge
from which we develop preventive interven-
tions to improve public health. The origins of
these interconnected internal goods are found
in the historical narratives and traditions of
epidemiology. The history of epidemiology is
not solely one of scientific discovery in the
name of public health. It is a history of evi-
dence-based preventive intervention revealed
in the lives and achievements of its heroes—
Snow, Farr, Goldberger, Lane-Claypon, and
Reed, among others—who took their scien-
tiﬁc ﬁndings beyond publication and applied
them so that the health of communities could
be improved. 
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we enter into a relationship not only with other
contemporary practitioners but also with those
who have preceded us, the heroes of our profes-
sion. In so doing, we commit to the goods
internal to our profession, the same goods that
others before us sought. We see no good reason
to change those internal goods or our commit-
ment to achieving them. To practice epidemiol-
ogy, therefore, means to apply the knowledge
carefully acquired in scientiﬁc research studies.
Given that epidemiologists are almost
universally engaged in the practice of scien-
tific research but are not equally engaged in
the practice of prevention in public health, we
may wonder if a commitment to science, the
best epidemiologic science, is sufficient for
actualizing health, the other social good to
which we are committed? Or is something
more required? It could be argued that by
practicing the best epidemiologic science, in-
asmuch as it is defined as the study of the
determinants and distributions of disease (or
sometimes, states of health) in populations,
we as epidemiologists are achieving an end,
scientific knowledge, that will eventually be
used to make decisions about prevention and
other direct public health applications. The
problem with this approach [a problem recog-
nized at least 50 years ago by physicists and
other basic scientists who participated in
developing the knowledge needed to con-
struct atomic weapons (Bronowski 1956)] is
that it leaves open the question: who in soci-
ety will ensure that decisions to apply science
will be made appropriately?
Put another way, if we as epidemiologists
are committed to the health of the public (and
who among us is not so committed), then
what excuses us from taking on the responsi-
bility of participating in the decisions that
directly affect the health of the public? How
better to ensure that the scientiﬁc knowledge
so painstakingly attained is put to its intended
use? Epidemiologists cannot claim to be com-
mitted to public health as a social good and
not accept the responsibility of ensuring that
the knowledge gained in their role as scientists
is used to achieve that good through active
participation in decisions on interventions for
disease prevention and control.
Others are involved in these decisions. By
no means are we suggesting that epidemiolo-
gists alone are those who will decide how to
best apply the scientiﬁc knowledge discovered,
reported, and interpreted. Many sit at the
table of public health decision making. Many
participate in public health action. All are
accountable. We believe, nevertheless, that
epidemiologists, by virtue of their special
training and experience, have a special
responsibility to participate in public health
action. Disease prevention and health promo-
tion are the primary goals of public health and
of epidemiology. To help achieve those goals,
those social goods, epidemiologists share the
dual societal roles and responsibilities of doing
the science and participating in the decisions
applying that science to communities.
One final issue requires our attention.
There are those who argue that an epidemiolo-
gist’s responsibility to participate in policymak-
ing and advocacy, any form of public health
intervention, is no more than that of any pri-
vate citizen. We disagree. The social responsi-
bility of a private citizen is not precisely that of
the public health professional. Society does not
expect from a person who sells coffee and
donuts at the supermarket, a bank president, a
poet, a fashion model, or the neighborhood
handyman precisely what it expects of epidemi-
ologists. Society expects more from public
health professionals, who have trained for many
years, studied the complexities of the issues,
received (in many cases) substantial funding
from public agencies, and are committed to the
tightly linked social goods of scientiﬁc knowl-
edge and better public health. Although all citi-
zens share a responsibility to participate in
public health decision making, the public
health professionals, including all those who call
themselves epidemiologists, have special respon-
sibilities by virtue of their training, experience,
and commitment to the goals and ends of pub-
lic health. A more complete accounting of the
responsibilities of epidemiologists follows.
A Summary of the
Responsibilities of
Epidemiologists
Epidemiologists have a responsibility to
perform scientific studies that matter to the
health of the public. They have a responsibility
to reliably perform the very best science, taking
into account the best standards of sound ethical
practice and engaging whenever possible with
the community being studied. Epidemiologists
have a responsibility to report their ﬁndings to
the scientiﬁc community. They have a responsi-
bility to inform the study population and the
communities within which the study popula-
tion resides. Epidemiologists have a responsibil-
ity to interpret the results of their studies in
terms of the current state of knowledge and to
join with others in the formulation of recom-
mendations for disease prevention and control
interventions. Epidemiologists have a responsi-
bility to participate in carrying out those inter-
ventions through public health policymaking
and thoughtful public health advocacy. For all
the actions and judgments these responsibilities
imply, epidemiologists are accountable.
Environmental Justice and
Social Responsibility
Pronouncements of the ethical responsibilities
of any public health profession such as epi-
demiology are important, but like professional
ethics guidelines and standards of scientific
conduct, are not always appreciated, much less
accepted, by those for whom they were
intended, especially when presented outside
the context of speciﬁc examples of their appli-
cation. To help bridge the gap between such
pronouncements and the real world of research
and practice, we turn to a specific example
within the complex realm of public health:
environmental justice. 
Our primary interest is to examine in that
arena how the social responsibilities of environ-
mental health researchers, and epidemiologists
in particular, are presented and fostered in the
environmental justice movement, especially
within CBPR. We limit our inquiry largely to
a recent special issue of this journal on the
topic of CBPR, recognizing that the topic is a
broad one, rich in historical detail, and subject
to different interpretations. 
The environmental justice movement has
made signiﬁcant progress in the past decade to
better understand and move toward ameliorat-
ing the disproportionate burden that environ-
mental degradation and pollution have had on
the health and well-being of communities of
color and of low socioeconomic status (Lee
2002; Shepard et al. 2002). CBPR is a good
example of a sponsored approach within the
movement that examines health disparities by
engaging active and equal partnerships between
community members and academic researchers
(Morello-Frosch et. al 2002; O’Fallon and
Dearry 2002; Sharp and Foster 2002). Many
examples of CBPR were featured in a recent
issue of this journal, including studies of lead
poisoning in rural children (Malcoe et al.
2002), pesticide safety in farmworkers (Arcury
et al. 2002), hazards to subsistence fishing
(Corburn 2002), and exposure to pollutants
from industrialized hog farming in the rural
South (Wilson et al. 2002). 
Our interest is primarily that of examin-
ing the roles and responsibilities of public
health researchers within the context of
CBPR. It is clear that the environmental jus-
tice movement as a movement embraces the
documentation of disparities as well as the
dissemination of findings, and the develop-
ment of interventions designed to effect
meaningful change in the environments and
health of affected communities. What is less
clear are the connections between research
and application and especially what responsi-
bilities environmental health researchers
accept in the context of CBPR.
Whereas the six principles of CBPR
endorsed by the National Institute of
Environmental Health Sciences emphasize the
importance of intervention research and
strategies, it is less clear how well these critical
components are accepted as responsibilities by
those who perform CBPR. Consider, for
example, a recently published paper by Wing,
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engaged in research on the impact of industri-
alized hog production facilities on communi-
ties of color in rural North Carolina (Wing
2002). Importantly, he provides a section
speciﬁcally addressing the social responsibilities
of researchers, organized around three major
headings: designing studies, responding to gov-
ernment, industry, and media, and respecting
individuals and communities. His list of social
responsibilities include
• Designing studies that matter to public
health without sacriﬁcing scientiﬁc rigor
• Maintaining communication with affected
communities and with political, academic,
and funding agencies
• Publishing ﬁndings in scientiﬁc journals and
making ﬁndings public
• Participating in processes involving the media
and policymakers (without specifying the
nature of that participation), and
• Reporting findings even if one expects
negative reactions from government bodies
and university administrators.
We have no quarrel with this account
except its lack of attention to the central
responsibility of public health researchers to
actively participate in interventions consistent
with their role as professionals committed to
the interconnected social goods of scientific
knowledge and improved health. A related
paper (Coughlin 1996) commits the same
error: leaving open the question of whether
epidemiologists should advocate on behalf of
unempowered communities. Thoughtful pub-
lic advocacy is also a part of our professional
responsibility (Weed 1994).
In sum, we support the goals of CBPR,
and more generally, those of the environmen-
tal justice movement. Both represent impor-
tant opportunities for all public health
professionals to make good on their promise
to society: to prevent disease and promote the
health of all communities through targeted
research and culturally appropriate effective
interventions.
Conclusions 
The responsibilities of epidemiologists,
stretching as they do from the application of
scientific knowledge back to its acquisition,
emerge from the fundamental commitments
of public health. As such, our responsibilities
are not negotiable, nor are they a matter of
personal preference (Kelley 2002; Sher 1996),
for we have posited ends that are valued and
have a claim on us beyond our choice of them.
Those ends become authoritative for us, entail
obligations for us, when we acknowledge and
commit to them as good and thereby accept
their claim on us. 
Surely some practitioners may be
employed in positions in which some of the
associated tasks are encouraged and others are
simply not part of the mission of the institu-
tion. That is sometimes the way things work in
contemporary society. But that possibility does
not give any practitioner of the profession the
right to declare that central tasks, public
policymaking, for example, are inappropriate
or should be avoided by others in the profes-
sion, whether they are employed in academia,
government, or in the private sector.
In our account of the nature of social
responsibility for public health researchers,
accountability and commitment and the reli-
able performance of professional tasks in the
pursuit of social goods are central concerns.
This account of responsibility incorporates
general ethical principles and obligations as
well as professional virtues and professional
ethics guidelines and codes of professional
conduct. 
Social responsibility is a fundamental
concern for the ethics of professional public
health practice. As further exploration ﬁlls in
other topographical details on the map of pub-
lic health ethics, we see our account of social
responsibility as the metaphorical equivalent of
compass points. Our journey cannot continue
without them.
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